Vague entailment

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):325 - 335 (2013)
Abstract
On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then all the specific facts about the distribution of hair on Harry's head, together with all the facts about Harry's comparison class, together with all the facts about our community-wide use of the word ?bald?, fail to settle whether Harry is bald. On the dominant view, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then nothing settles whether Harry is bald?it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. Call this view vagueness-as-indeterminacy. Vagueness-as-indeterminacy entails the following proposition: that clear vagueness as to whether Harry is bald clearly does not entail that Harry is bald. I argue against this proposition, and thus against vagueness-as-indeterminacy. My argument consists of a defence of the following rival proposition: that it is vague whether clear vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that Harry is bald. The argument itself is short. Most of the paper is devoted to responding to various objections to the argument, as well as attempting to explain away the initial appeal of the proposition that clear vagueness as to whether Harry is bald clearly does not entail that Harry is bald
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References found in this work BETA
David Barnett (2009). Is Vagueness Sui Generis ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
Richmond Campbell (1974). The Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):175 - 191.
James Cargile (1969). The Sorites Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):193-202.
Cian Dorr (2003). Vagueness Without Ignorance. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):83–113.

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