Scheme-based alethic realism: Agency, the environment, and truthmaking [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 14 (2):173-196 (2004)
Abstract
  This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these stable elements, while constraining representational and linguistic schemes, do not define a single framework for truthmaking relations. We strengthen this position by considering themes on situated rational agency from cognitive science and artificial intelligence, arguing that whatever enables or supports rational action within a particular environment must figure into some account of truth and truthmaking, and vice versa
Keywords Kant   agency   artificial intelligence   cognitive science   conceptual schemes   framework   ontology   pluralism   rationality   realism   situated cognition   truth
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    Murat Baç (2006). Pluralistic Kantianism. Philosophical Forum 37 (2):183–204.
    Murat Bac (2006). Pluralistic Kantianism. Philosophical Forum 37 (2):183-204.
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