Graduate studies at Western
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1):39 - 46 (1987)
|Abstract||Crombie's acceptance of the deliberate commission of a category mistake in his defense of the meaningfulness of theological statements raises a pointed challenge to the philosophy of Ryle which seems not to have been specifically addressed in subsequent literature. We review the analysis which leads Crombie into it, including concepts of anomaly, deficiency, affinity, and inadequate notion, noting basic differences in method and attitude from Ryle. We express our own agreements and disagreements in keeping with an overall concern for the preservation of rationality in this sphere of language, finding acceptable distinct contributions to that end from both.|
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