David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Research Archives 8:531-534 (1982)
Proponents of The Free Will Defense frequently argue that it is necessary for God to create self-directing beings who possess the capacity for producing evil because, in the words of F.R. Tennant, “moral goodness must be the result of a self-directing developmental process.” But if this is true, David Paulsen has recently argued, then the proponent of the Free Will Defense cannot claim that God has an eternally determinate nature. For if God has an eternally determinatenature and moral goodness must be the result of a developmental process, then God cannot be considered morally good. In response, I argue that (1) many contemporary Free Will theists do not affirm a developmental concept of morality and thus avoid Paulsen’s criticism and that (2) even those who affirm a developmental concept of morality on the human level need not grant that divine morality is also developmental in nature
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard M. Gale (1990). Freedom and the Free Will Defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.
David Basinger (1982). Anderson on Plantinga. Philosophy Research Archives 8:315-320.
David L. Paulsen (1981). Divine Determinateness and the Free Will Defence. Analysis 41 (3):150 - 153.
R. Zachary Manis (2011). Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.
Kenneth Boyce (2011). Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.
Theodore Guleserian (2000). Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):348-366.
Robert P. Lovering (2004). Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):89 - 107.
Jill Graper Hernandez (2010). Moral Evil and Leibniz's Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence. Sophia 49 (1):1-13.
W. Matthews Grant (2003). Aquinas, Divine Simplicity, and Divine Freedom. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:129-144.
David O'Connor (1987). A Variation on the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 4 (2):160-167.
Robert T. Lehe (1986). God's Perfection and Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):319-323.
Kevin Timpe (2007). Truth-Making and Divine Eternity. Religious Studies 43 (3):299 - 315.
Dean Zimmerman (2003). Richard Gale and the Free Will Defense. Philo 6 (1):78-113.
Marilyn McCord Adams (1987). Duns Scotus on the Goodness of God. Faith and Philosophy 4 (4):486-505.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads4 ( #272,677 of 1,140,334 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #140,127 of 1,140,334 )
How can I increase my downloads?