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- David Basinger (1983). In What Sense Must God Be Omnibenevolent? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):3 - 15.
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In “Omnibenevolence and Eternal Damnation”, I consider whether it is consistent to hold both that God is omnibenevolent and that he infinitely punishes human beings for the commission of finite transgressions. In exploring this problem, I discuss the utilitarian and retributive notions of punishment and justice, the possible mitigating effect of forewarning, and differing conceptions of the nature of the relationship of God to human beings. My conclusion is that it is inconsistant to hold both of these beliefs.
Finding the heart of God -- Finding God's heart -- Have you seen God's face? -- Why does God sing? -- Searching God's mind -- When God is silent -- Did you know God thinks about you? -- God has unique plans for every unsaved person -- God remembers no longer -- Did you know God reads and writes? -- The unknowable of God -- God whispers -- DoesGod have a nose? -- Wax in God's ears -- God loves to provide for our needs -- God's eyes see all -- What God hates -- God heals protectively -- A laughing God -- A tired Jesus -- What angers God? -- God is love -- The holiness of God -- God is good -- God is person -- God is the all-powerful God -- God is all-knowing -- God is everywhere present -- God is spirit -- God does not change -- The Trinity three in one.
Finding the heart of God -- Finding God's heart -- Have you seen God's face? -- Why does God sing? -- Searching God's mind -- When God is silent -- Did you know God thinks about you? -- God has unique plans for every unsaved person -- God remembers no longer -- Did you know God reads and writes? -- The unknowable of God -- God whispers -- DoesGod have a nose? -- Wax in God's ears -- God loves to provide for our needs -- God's eyes see all -- What God hates -- God heals protectively -- A laughing God -- A tired Jesus -- What angers God? -- God is love -- The holiness of God -- God is good -- God is person -- God is the all-powerful God -- God is all-knowing -- God is everywhere present -- God is spirit -- God does not change -- The Trinity three in one.
According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they con ict with traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrines concerning divine attributes.
The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free with respect to morally significant actions and who are thereby responsible, at least in part, for those actions and the personal character which is a function of and exhibited in those actions. The free will defender contends that if an agent is to be truly responsible for her actions, then she must be free to bring about both good and evil, and God cannot be blamed if such agents choose to bring about the latter rather than the former. A number of years ago, Antony Flew objected that God was not forced to choose between creating free agents who might act wrongly and not creating a world with free agents. Instead, God could have created free agents who were wholly good, i.e. who always acted rightly." Freedom and responsibility, Flew argued, are compatible with one’s actions being causally determined by God, thus it was within God’s power to create agents who were both free and responsible yet causally determined to always act rightly. In response, proponents of the free will defence criticized Flew’s conditional analysis of freedom – if S had chosen to do otherwise, she would have been able to do otherwise – maintaining instead that an agent’s freedom consists in her ability at the time in question to both perform the action and refrain from performing the action. Acting freely, on this libertarian view, is incompatible with one’s actions being determined by God, for an agent..
Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.
I have argued elsewhere that nearly all existing arguments against Anselmian theism—such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God’s inability to sin, and the problem of evil—can be refuted all at once by holding that God possesses the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence instead of insisting that He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Some critics suggest, however, that my strategy fails, at least with respect to the problem of evil, because that problem defeats not only the version of theism that depends on God’s being omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but also versions of theism that do not depend on that thesis. In this paper I defend my strategy against such a criticism.
Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made a better world than the one in which we live. Many different possible worlds are better than this one. Some have less natural or moral evil than this world, and some even have no natural or moral evils at all. Consequently, there is no God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent because such a God would have made one of those worlds that is better than this one.
Discussion of David Basinger, In what sense must God be omnibenevolent?
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