Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324 (2009)
|Abstract||One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.|
|Keywords||physicalism inference to the best explanation explanatory argument kim, jaegwon reduction psychophysical correlation psychophysical identity|
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