David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):115-145 (2000)
This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized.
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Citations of this work BETA
Robert Batterman (2010). On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):1-25.
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
Joshua Rosaler (2015). Local Reduction in Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:54-69.
Ausonio Marras (2007). Kim's Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 66 (3):305 - 327.
Eric Hochstein (2013). Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):199-217.
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