Abstract
This paper aims to describe and defend a Pluralistic Kantian, as opposed to a Tractarian, version of realism vis-à-vis the ontological basis of truthmaking relations. One underlying assumption of my position is that propositional truth is a robust property and, consequently, is normatively distinct from epistemic justification. Still, it does not follow from this realist contention that truth is generated ontologically, viz., independently of cognitive and intensional contributions of human agents. This point brings my view notably close to H. Putnam’s peculiar blend of certain Wittgensteinian and Kantian themes. However, I argue that Putnam’s apparent denial of the in-itself reality with an intrinsic structure gives rise to a rather un-Kantian and problematic metaphysical picture. I suggest that the solution to the puzzle may be found in a synthesis of the best intuitions of Armstrong’s Tractarian realism and Putnam’s quasi-Kantianism.