David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64 (2004)
The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification are in fact in reflective equilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory choices in empirical sciences. If reflective equilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology.
|Keywords||intuitions as evidence analytic epistemology reflective equilibrium appeal to intuition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
Carson Strong (2010). Theoretical and Practical Problems with Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2):123-140.
Ben Eggleston (2010). Practical Equilibrium: A Way of Deciding What to Think About Morality. Mind 119 (475):549 - 584.
K. Kappel (2006). The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):131-147.
Joakim Sandberg & Niklas Juth (2011). Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (3):209-226.
Theo van Willigenburg (1998). Norman Daniels: Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice & Folke Tersman, Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):129-132.
Kai Nielsen (1982). Grounding Rights and a Method of Reflective Equilibrium. Inquiry 25 (3):277 – 306.
Edward Stein (1994). Rationality and Reflective Equilibrium. Synthese 99 (2):137-72.
Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath (2010). Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough? Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads132 ( #10,577 of 1,696,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #14,723 of 1,696,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?