Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 74 (1):81-99 (2011)
|Abstract||Several philosophers of science and metaphysicians claim that the dispositional properties of fundamental particles, such as the mass, charge, and spin of electrons, are ungrounded in any further properties. It is assumed by those making this argument that such properties are intrinsic, and thus if they are grounded at all they must be grounded intrinsically. However, this paper advances an argument, with one empirical premise and one metaphysical premise, for the claim that mass is extrinsically grounded and is thus an extrinsic disposition. Although the argument concerns mass characterized as a disposition, it applies equally well whether mass is a categorical or dispositional property; however, the dispositional nature of mass is relevant to some important objections and implications discussed|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ross Cameron (2009). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
Neil Edward Williams (2009). The Ungrounded Argument is Unfounded: A Response to Mumford. Synthese 170 (1):7 - 19.
Yuri Balashov (1999). Zero-Value Physical Quantities. Synthese 119 (3):253-286.
William A. Bauer (2010). The Ontology of Pure Dispositions. Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.
Sean Drysdale Walsh (2011). Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value. Ratio 24 (3):311-325.
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
David Efird (2010). The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):50-57.
Dennis Lehmkuhl (2011). Mass-Energy-Momentum: Only There Because of Spacetime? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):453-488.
J. McKitrick (2003). A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
Brian Weatherson (2006). Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Properties. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition).
Kris McDaniel (2007). Extended Simples. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
Stathis Psillos (2006). What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):137-156.
David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.
Added to index2010-12-28
Total downloads59 ( #19,765 of 739,318 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,318 )
How can I increase my downloads?