Contrastivism rather than something else? On the limits of epistemic contrastivism

Erkenntnis 69 (2):189 - 200 (2008)
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too narrow concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Fred I. Dretske (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
    Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
    Bredo C. Johnsen (2001). Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):385 - 406.

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