Interdefining causation and intervention

Dialectica 63 (2):175-194 (2009)
Abstract
Non-reductive interventionist theories of causation and methodologies of causal reasoning embedded in that theoretical framework have become increasingly popular in recent years. This paper argues that one variant of an interventionist account of causation, viz. the one presented, for example, in Woodward (2003 ), is unsuited as a theoretical fundament of interventionist methodologies of causal reasoning, because it renders corresponding methodologies incapable of uncovering a causal structure in a finite number of steps. This finding runs counter to Woodward's own assessment and to other recent studies which presume that Woodward's version of interventionism is effectively applicable to uncover causal structures, e.g. Campbell (2007 ) or Shapiro and Sober (2007 ).
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,768
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.

View all 23 references

Citations of this work BETA
Jens Harbecke (2011). Mechanistic Constitution in Neurobiological Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):267-285.
Michael Baumgartner & Isabelle Drouet (2013). Identifying Intervention Variables. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):183-205.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-06-16

Total downloads

53 ( #29,449 of 1,098,976 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #22,413 of 1,098,976 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.