Knowledge and Dogmatism

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19 (2013)
There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ version and a ‘closure’ version) and offer a solution for one version (the permissibility version) of the problem. No matter how much a subject knows, knowledge never gives one a license to ignore evidence against a proposition. Premise (1) of the argument is false and the puzzle can thus be resolved
Keywords dogmatism puzzle
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00104.x
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Ru Ye (2015). Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.

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