Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's moral contrastivism

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470 (2008)
Abstract
In his recent book Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255.

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Citations of this work BETA
Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):471–477.
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