The instrumentalist and formalist elements of Berkeley's philosophy of mathematics

Abstract
The main thesis of this paper is that, Contrary to general belief, George berkeley did in fact express a coherent philosophy of mathematics in his major published works. He treated arithmetic and geometry separately and differently, And this paper focuses on his philosophy of arithmetic, Which is shown to be strikingly similar to the 19th and 20th century philosophies of mathematics known as 'formalism' and 'instrumentalism'. A major portion of the paper is devoted to showing how this philosophy of mathematics follows directly from berkeley's theory of signs and his philosophy of language, And from his discovery of an alternative to the correspondence theory of truth used by most of his predecessors
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    References found in this work BETA
    Stephen Francis Barker (1964). Philosophy of Mathematics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Claire Schwartz (2010). Berkeley et Les idées généraLes mathématiques. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de L'Étranger 200 (1):31 - 44.
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