A Humean Temporal Logic

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 (Analytic Philosophy and Logic):209-216 (2000)
Abstract
Hume argues that the idea of duration is just the idea of the manner in which several things in succession are arrayed. In other words, the idea of duration is the idea of successiveness. He concludes that all and only successions have duration. Hume also argues that there is such a thing as a steadfast object—something which co-exists with many things in succession, but which is not itself a succession. Thus, it seems that Hume has committed himself to a contradiction: A steadfast object lacks duration because it is not a succession, but has duration because it co-exists with something which has duration. I am not going to discuss why Hume thinks these things. My goal is simply to show that what he thinks is consistent. To do so, I will offer a Humean temporal logic
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