Instantiation as partial identity

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):449 – 464 (2001)
Abstract
Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over Many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change.
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David Armstrong (2005). Reply to Simons and Mumford. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):271 – 276.

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