The Discernibility of Identicals

I argue via examples that there are cases in which things that are not two distinct things qualitatively differ without contradiction. In other words, there are cases in which something differs from itself. Standard responses to such cases are to divide the thing into distinct parts, or to conceive of the thing under different descriptions, or to appeal to different times, or to deny that the property had is the property lacked. I show these responses to be unsatisfactory. I then gather and systematize available ways of talking about such cases with phrases like ‘insofar as’ , ‘qua’ , ‘to the extent that’, ‘in some respect’, etc., while paying special attention to the scope of ‘not’ when used with these phrases. This allows me to show how we can speak of self-differing without contradiction.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr_1999_16
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Meg Wallace (2011). Composition as Identity: Part 1. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):804-816.
Meg Wallace (2011). Composition as Identity: Part 2. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):817-827.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Dan López de Sa (2010). How to Respond to Borderline Cases. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
David Slutsky (2001). Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):595-610.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

43 ( #77,200 of 1,724,771 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #50,612 of 1,724,771 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.