Online research in philosophy

Over the last three decades, truth-condition theories have earned a central place in the study of linguistic meaning. But their honored position faces a threat from recent deflationism or minimalism about truth. It is thought that the appeal to truth-conditions in a theory of meaning is incompatible with deflationism about truth, and so the growing popularity of deflationism threatens truth-condition theories of meaning.

The author describes a published symposium which debated Is Critical Thinking Biased? The symposium meant to address concerns about critical thinking that are being expressed by feminist and postmodern scholars. However, through the author's critique, and the symposium respondent's, we learn the participants ended up begging the question of bias. The author maintains that the belief that critical thinking is unbiased is based on an assumption that knowers can be separated from what is known. She argues that critical thinking is a tool which has no life of its own, it only has meaning and purpose when fallible, biased people use it (weak sense bias). She challenges the idea of a transcendental epistemological perspective, thus all knowledge is provisional and perspectival (strong sense bias). The author begins to redescribe a transformed critical thinking as constructive thinking.

Truth and correspondence, by G.J. Warnock.--Some exercises in epistemic logic, by A.N. Prior.--Symposium: Meaning and speech acts, by J.R. Searle.--Comments, by Zeno Vendler.--Comments, by Paul Benacerraf.--Rejoinders, by J.R. Searle.--Symposium: Wittgenstein on criteria, by Newton Garver.--Commments, by Carl Ginet.--Comments by F.A. Siegler.--Comments, by Paul Ziff.--Rejoinders, by Newton Garver.--Symposium: The private-language argument, by H-N. Castañeda.--Comments, by V.C. Chappell.--Comments, by J.F. Thomson.--Rejoinders, by H-N. Castañeda.