Divided brains and unified phenomenology: a review essay on michael tye's consciousness and persons [Book Review]

Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512 (2005)
In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080500229993
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Oliver Rashbrook (2013). Diachronic and Synchronic Unity. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):465-484.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

78 ( #43,354 of 1,726,237 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #66,646 of 1,726,237 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.