In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions

Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88 (2005)
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.
Keywords Belief  Delusion  Doxastic  Epistemology  Imagination
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DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Dub (2015). Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).

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