Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88 (2005)
|Abstract||In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained|
|Keywords||Belief Delusion Doxastic Epistemology Imagination|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Keith Frankish (2012). Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances. Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.
Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1):1-4.
Dominic Murphy (2012). The Folk Epistemology of Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.
Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
Maura Tumulty (2011). Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief. Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
Tim Bayne (2011). Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4).
Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #8,087 of 549,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #8,860 of 549,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?