David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88 (2005)
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained
|Keywords||Belief Delusion Doxastic Epistemology Imagination|
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Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
Jordi Fernández (2010). Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Mad Belief? Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
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