David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. OUP/British Academy (2011)
Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in this chapter is with views of the second kind. According to an increasingly influential line of thought, our common-sense commitment to the existence of free will is threatened in unique ways by what we are learning from the sciences of human agency
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Joshua Shepherd (2015). Scientific Challenges to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 10 (3):197-207.
Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2014). Can Conscious Agency Be Saved? Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
Marcela Herdova (2016). Are Intentions in Tension with Timing Experiments? Philosophical Studies 173 (3):573-587.
Grant S. Shields (2014). Neuroscience and Conscious Causation: Has Neuroscience Shown That We Cannot Control Our Own Actions? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):565-582.
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