Perception and the reach of phenomenal content

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404 (2009)
Abstract
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). What is Touch? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.
Barry Dainton (2010). Phenomenal Holism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):113-139.
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
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