Online research in philosophy

A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least as severe as the purported difficulties for naturalized epistemology. Second, some examples of the ways in which norms are proposed and evaluated in the course of scientific research are considered and it is concluded that science has no need for trans?scientific norms. Finally, the three arguments introduced at the outset have no force when they are viewed in the light of the preceding discussion.

Quine’s (1969a) arguments for naturalizing epistemology have sparked dissent from the ranks of traditional epistemologists. For example, Kim (1988) complains that by making epistemology a “chapter of psychology,” the naturalist robs epistemology of its normative force and thereby its status of genuine epistemology. I agree with the spirit of Kim’s objection, but it is not likely that naturalized epistemology must abandon normativity in an explicit and obvious way, or that normative alternatives of the kind Kim envisions are available (Bayer 2007). Quine himself insists his epistemology is normative (1986a; 1992), and generic proposals for naturalizing normativity abound. But even if Quine nominally retains a major element of traditional epistemology, it may still be asked whether this element is enough, given the overall nature of Quine’s project.

In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's "no first philosophy" doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well.

Naturalists seek continuity between epistemology and science. Critics argue this illegitimately expands science into epistemology and commits the fallacy of scientism. Must naturalists commit this fallacy? I defend a conception of naturalized epistemology which upholds the non-identity of epistemic ends, norms, and concepts with scientific evidential ends, norms, and concepts. I argue it enables naturalists to avoid three leading scientistic fallacies: dogmatism, one dimensionalism, and granting science an epistemic monopoly.

This essay explores numerous and complicated naturalized epistemology against the background of pragmatism. We distinguish three programmes of naturalized epistemology: strong, moderate, and weak. By considering commitments of pragmatism on which different programmes depend, we point out the close-knit relationship between pragmatism and naturalized epistemology. We also illustrate the essential origin of today’s controversy over naturalized epistemology and predict the uptrend of naturalized epistemology.

This paper offers an interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this interpretation of Quine, it is essential that a successful critic of naturalism also examine Quine’s aforementioned principles. The divide between naturalist and nonnaturalist epistemology turns out to be defined by the divide between more fundamental naturalist and nonnaturalist approaches to semantics.

Many critics of W.V. Quine’s essay “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969) treat Quine’s proposal to make epistemology a “chapter of psychology” as a proposal for abandoning normative epistemology. One of the most prominent critics to make this contention is Jaegwon Kim (1988). Kim objects that by merely describing the causal relationship between cognitive input and output, Quine’s naturalism abandons the normative concept of “justification,” the normative element of the concept of “knowledge”, and therefore genuine epistemology. Kim also urges that aside from the concept of “justification,” even the concept of “belief” has a normative dimension, and that any epistemology wishing to dispense with normativity must also dispense with “belief”—a seemingly absurd consequence for naturalists who otherwise seem to be enamored of discussing reliable belief-forming processes.

Naturalism implies unity of method--an application of the methods of science to the methodology of science itself and to value theory. Epistemological naturalists have tried to find a privileged discipline to be the methodological model of philosophy of science and epistemology. However, since science itself is not unitary, the use of one science as a model amounts to a reduction and distorts the philosophy of science just as badly as traditional philosophy of science distorted science, despite the fact that the central theme of naturalized philosophy of science is that methodology should be true to science as practiced. I argue that naturalized philosophy of science must apply a plurality of methods to epistemological issues.

Naturalized epistemology—the recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science—is often criticized for dispensing with the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that epistemologists are correct to reject naturalism, but that new arguments are needed to show why this is so. I establish my thesis first by evaluating two prominent varieties of naturalism—optimistic and pessimistic—and then by offering a proposal for how a new version of non-naturalistic epistemology must move forward. Optimistic naturalism attempts to use scientific methods to give positive answers to traditional epistemological questions. Epistemologists, for example, are urged to draw on psychology and evolutionary biology in order to show our beliefs are justified. I argue that this project fails. First, the naturalist’s thesis that theory is underdetermined by evidence poses difficulties for the optimist’s attempt to show that our beliefs are justified, even according to naturalized standards. Second, while critics usually contest naturalists’ logical right to use the concept of normative justification, I suggest that a deeper problem is with the naturalists’ use of the concept of belief. Naturalistic philosophy of mind, while perhaps acceptable for other purposes, does not deliver a concept of “belief” consistent with the constraints and needs of naturalized epistemology. Pessimistic naturalism—Quine’s project—takes it for granted that “belief” is problematic and logical justification elusive, and instead offers a pragmatic account of the development of our theory of the world. This project, while deeply unsatisfactory to the traditional epistemologist, also faces the challenge of privileging scientific discourse over other pragmatically successful modes of discourse. Whatever its merits, we can undermine its motivation by challenging the underdetermination thesis it rests on. We can do this by appealing to facts about scientific practice that undermine the conception of confirmation driving the thesis, by appealing to other facts about scientific practice, and by challenging some philosophical preconceptions, in order to make room for a new brand of inductivist foundationalism..

There is a widespread belief among intellectuals that the domain of philosophy shrinks as the domain of the special sciences expands, and that someday, science might swallow up philosophy entirely. Some philosophical naturalists think that this day may have already arrived. These naturalists believe that philosophy's methodology should be the same as that of natural science; they imply that philosophy has no distinctive "armchair" methodology of its own.