Being right, and being in the right

Inquiry 51 (6):627 – 644 (2008)
This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.
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    Talbot Brewer (2002). Maxims and Virtues. Philosophical Review 111 (4):539-572.
    Barbara Herman (1996). Making Room for Character. In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press. 36--60.

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