A priori knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174 (1996)
Abstract
This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central topics such as the nature of consciousness. Next a counterfactual account of intuitions proposed by Sosa is criticized. Finally, in response to certain questions raised by Sosa, the explanation of the evidential status of intuition offered in the original paper receives further elaboration.
Keywords Epistemology of Intuition
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372780
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PhilPapers Archive George Bealer, A priori knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa
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