|Abstract||This paper has three parts. First, a discussion of our use of intuitions as evidence (reasons) in logic, mathematics, philosophy (hereafter, “the a priori disciplines”). Second, an explanation of why intuitions are evidence. The explanation is provided by modal reliabilism—the doctrine that there is a certain kind of qualified modal tie between intuitions and the truth. Third, an explanation of why there should be such a tie between intuitions and the truth. This tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess the concepts involved in our intuitions. These three parts form the basis of a unified account of a priori evidence and, in turn, a priori knowledge|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
Janice L. Dowell (2008). Empirical Metaphysics: The Role of Intuitions About Possible Cases in Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19 - 46.
George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.
Nate Charlow (2013). Presupposition and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.
Hamid Vahid (1999). A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):173 – 188.
Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Derk Pereboom (1990). Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy. Synthese 85 (1):25 - 54.
Paul Tidman (1996). The Justification of a Priori Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):161-171.
George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads47 ( #27,259 of 722,707 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,864 of 722,707 )
How can I increase my downloads?