|Abstract||Curry's paradox, so named for its discoverer, namely Haskell B. Curry, is a paradox within the family of so-called paradoxes of self-reference (or paradoxes of circularity). Like the liar paradox (e.g., ‘this sentence is false’) and Russell's paradox , Curry's paradox challenges familiar naive theories, including naive truth theory (unrestricted T-schema) and naive set theory (unrestricted axiom of abstraction), respectively. If one accepts naive truth theory (or naive set theory), then Curry's paradox becomes a direct challenge to one's theory of logical implication or entailment. Unlike the liar and Russell paradoxes Curry's paradox is negation-free; it may be generated irrespective of one's theory of negation. An intuitive version of the paradox runs as follows.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Jeffrey Barrett (2004). Computer Implication and the Curry Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):631 - 637.
Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Loïc Colson (2007). Another Paradox in Naive Set-Theory. Studia Logica 85 (1):33 - 39.
Michael Glanzberg (2003). Minimalism and Paradoxes. Synthese 135 (1):13 - 36.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2000). The Principle of Uniform Solution (of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference). Mind 109 (433):117-122.
Seiki Akama (1996). Curry's Paradox in Contractionless Constructive Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):135 - 150.
Susan Rogerson (2007). Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.
Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #15,950 of 549,068 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,186 of 549,068 )
How can I increase my downloads?