Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, not by Fiat

Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366 (2016)
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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation.

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Michael Beaton
University of the Basque Country

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