Defending logical pluralism
| Abstract | We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesMatthew W. McKeon (2010). The Concept of Logical Consequence: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Peter Lang Pub..
Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (2009). Modalism and Logical Pluralism. Mind 118 (470):295 - 321.
Patrick Allo (2007). Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
Nicola Ciprotti & Luca Moretti (2009). Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism About Metaphysical Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284.
Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press.
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads96 ( #6,724 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,311 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
