Introducing Levinas to undergraduate philosophers
| Abstract | The question of the source of the moral "ought" is no small question, nor is it unimportant. Our own philosophical tradition has dealt with the question in several ways producing a variety of answers. Some of these include locating the "ought" in the structure of reason (Kant), in the human being's desire for pleasure (Utilitarianism), or in the will of God (Aquinas). The reason why the question is so important is because different conceptions of the source of the moral ought ultimately give rise to different conceptions of what is right and wrong; they also affect the way we answer the biggest of all ethical questions, why be good. | |||||||||
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