|Abstract||We can discern three types of amoral beings in Kant’s ethical philosophy (B1 - B3 below), one kind of moral being (B4), the true moral agent, and one kind of immoral being (B5), for five kinds in all: B1) beings that are driven solely by inclination, such as animals. B2) beings that act solely out of reason and, therefore, duty, such as divine intellects.|
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