Kantian and non-Kantian “agents”

Abstract
We can discern three types of amoral beings in Kant ’s ethical philosophy, one kind of moral being, the true moral agent, and one kind of immoral being, for five kinds in all: B1) beings that are driven solely by inclination, such as animals. B2) beings that act solely out of reason and, therefore, duty, such as divine intellects
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