Logical pluralism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493 (2000)
Abstract
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many.
Keywords Logic
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Call number BC71.B425 2006
ISBN(s) 0199288410     9780199288410
DOI 10.1080/00048400012349751
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References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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