Logical pluralism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493 (2000)
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Abstract

Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many

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Author Profiles

Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Negation on the Australian Plan.Francesco Berto & Greg Restall - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1119-1144.
Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
Making sense of logical pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Situations and attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Remarks on the foundations of mathematics.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Oxford [Eng.]: Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees & G. H. von Wright.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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