Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328 (1985)
Abstract
Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff x thinks m(p). Such deviant relations satisfy the commonly discussed functionalist psychological principles. Finally, a more complicated system of deviant relations is constructed, one satisfying sophisticated principles dealing with the self-conscious rational mind.
Keywords Functionalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Self-consciousness  Thinking  Transformation  Quine
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00065.x
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Ned Block (1990). Consciousness and Accessibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
Max Velmans (1990). Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
John R. Searle (1990). Who is Computing with the Brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.

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