Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance

In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 71--125 (2002)
The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition , modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism
Keywords Epistemology  Modality
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Christopher Gregory Weaver (forthcoming). Yet Another New Cosmological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-21.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.

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