Mental properties

Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208 (1994)
It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment.
Keywords Essentialism  Identity  Intuition  Mental Property  Metaphysics  Mind-body  Modality  Descartes  Twin Earth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI jphil199491433
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
Kwang Su Kim (1986). Ontology, Appearance and the Mind-Body Problem. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
Frank Jackson (1995). Essentialism, Mental Properties, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-268.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

209 ( #5,784 of 1,724,892 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #44,253 of 1,724,892 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.