On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates
Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382 (2000)
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Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):102-117.
Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
Douglas Edwards (2008). How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68 (298):143–149.
Christine Tappolet (2000). Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
Timothy J. Nulty (2010). The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.
Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
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