On the identification of properties and propositional functions

Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14 (1989)
Abstract
Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would be lost.
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (1986). The Logical Status of Mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):231-74.

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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
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