On the identification of properties and propositional functions

Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14 (1989)
Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would be lost.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00627396
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.

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Bjørn Jespersen (2008). Predication and Extensionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.

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