Philosophy 75 (1):127-130 (2000)
|Abstract||According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity theory by dissolving the alleged problem of specifying the "right fact".-correspondence to: bealluconn.edu|
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