David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield 201-240 (1998)
The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1996).
|Keywords||Metaphysics of Intuition, Phenomenology of Intuition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Inc. 128-159.
Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
Jennifer Wright (2010). On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
James Andow (2015). Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Similar books and articles
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
Yanming An (1997). Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition: Cultural Context and the Evolution of Terms. Philosophy East and West 47 (3):337-362.
Sheila McLean (2010). Autonomy, Consent and the Law. Routledge-Cavendish.
George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
Michael J. Shaffer (2007). Bealer on the Autonomy of Philosophical and Scientific Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 38 (1):44–54.
Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg, Empirical Challenges to the Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy, or Why We Are Not “Judgment Skeptics”.
Alexander Sarch (2010). Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy. Synthese 172 (3):451 - 474.
Added to index2009-05-09
Total downloads144 ( #24,960 of 1,793,096 )
Recent downloads (6 months)130 ( #3,288 of 1,793,096 )
How can I increase my downloads?