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David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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J. C. Beall (ed.)
Oxford University Press (2007)
The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says (only) that it is false. How, then, should we classify Liar sentences? Are they true or false? A natural suggestion would be that Liars are neither true nor false; that is, they fall into a category beyond truth and falsity. This solution might resolve the initial problem, but it beckons the Liar's revenge. A sentence that says of itself only that it is false or beyond truth and falsity will, in effect, bring back the initial problem. The Liar's revenge is a witness to the hydra-like nature of Liars: in dealing with one Liar you often bring about another. JC Beall presents fourteen new essays and an extensive introduction, which examine the nature of the Liar paradox and its resistance to any attempt to solve it. Written by some of the world's leading experts in the field, the papers in this volume will be an important resource for those working in truth studies, philosophical logic, and philosophy of language, as well as those with an interest in formal semantics and metaphysics.
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Greg Restall, Curry's Revenge: The Costs of Non-Classical Solutions to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference.
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Leon Horsten (forthcoming). One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
Lionel Shapiro (2011). Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314.
Mark Pinder (2015). A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):151-161.
Arvid Båve (2012). On Using Inconsistent Expressions. Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Colin Caret & Aaron J. Cotnoir (2008). True, False, Paranormal and 'Designated'?: A Reply to Jenkins. Analysis 68 (299):238–244.
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