Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117 (1997)
|Abstract||Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.|
|Keywords||Cogito Functionalism Materialism Mental Property Metaphysics Reductionism Self-consciousness Descartes Shoemaker, S Tarski|
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