Self-consciousness

Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117 (1997)
Abstract
Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates the thesis that the mental properties are fully “natural” universals. Accordingly, mental properties are sui generis: first-order, nonphysical, natural universals.
Keywords Cogito  Functionalism  Materialism  Mental Property  Metaphysics  Reductionism  Self-consciousness  Descartes  Shoemaker, S  Tarski
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2998342
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive George Bealer, Self-consciousness
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

249 ( #9,785 of 1,907,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

26 ( #27,405 of 1,907,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.