Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117 (1997)
Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
Keywords Cogito  Functionalism  Materialism  Mental Property  Metaphysics  Reductionism  Self-consciousness  Descartes  Shoemaker, S  Tarski
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DOI 10.2307/2998342
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Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.

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