Abstract

In following what I take to be the central theme in these volumes I have not discussed several topics which are important and deserve mention: a careful, lengthy section on ‘justice’ and the disambiguation of various of its senses, a fecund account of the difference between classical and romantic modes in argumentation, a brief but incisive critique of Skinner's behaviorism, a treatment of the function of various sorts of “commonplaces” and “confused notions” in argument, and a consideration of the relation between law and morality.While I think Perelman's project of defending a non-formal logic of value judgments finally unsuccessful, this judgment should not obscure my admiration for these volumes, which offer constantly incisive provocations to our thought about practical valuation. Perelman's work raises fundamental questions about the assumptions of recent work in ethics and social theory concerning the project of the rational justification of fundamental moral and social principles. The depth and systematic sweep of these interlocking essays compels us (in a dialectically justified way, I hasten to say) to rethink our methodological allegiances as well as the connection between our ‘background’ theories and the practice such theories address. Specifically, Perelman's probing account forces any theorist with aspirations for a conclusive justification of values to concern himself with the implications of a conceptual and value relativism, the challenge of ‘the audience’ to be addressed, the possible incompatibility of absolute justification and ‘deliberation,’ and the challenge of the possible practical indeterminacy of the general values or norms said to be rationally inescapable. For reasons such as these Perelman's two volumes are well worth the time of philosophers, social scientists and educational theorists concerned with the issues of argument and the enterprise of the justification of fundamental principles or values