The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail

Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307 (2001)
In “Self-Consciousness” (Philosophical Review, 1997), the author establishes: (I) all the leading formulations of functionalism are mistaken because their proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mental properties themselves) into the contents of self-consciousness, and (II) a certain nonreductive functionalism is the only viable alternative (which no longer underwrites functionalism’s materialist solution to the Mind-Body Problem). Michael Tooley’s critique provides no criticism of (I), except for a failed attack on certain familiar self-intimation principles. Moreover, by advocating a form of nonreductive functionalism himself, he tacitly accepts (II). While defending these points, the author discusses differences between Frege’s and Russell’s treatments of intensional contexts and the Kripke-Lewis controversy over theoretical terms.
Keywords Functionalism  Intensionality  Metaphysics  Self-consciousness  Theoretical Term  Frege  Kripke, S  Lewis, D  Russell  Shoemaker, S  Tooley, M
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010358801138
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PhilPapers Archive George Bealer, The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail
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