David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307 (2001)
In “Self-Consciousness” (Philosophical Review, 1997), the author establishes: (I) all the leading formulations of functionalism are mistaken because their proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mental properties themselves) into the contents of self-consciousness, and (II) a certain nonreductive functionalism is the only viable alternative (which no longer underwrites functionalism’s materialist solution to the Mind-Body Problem). Michael Tooley’s critique provides no criticism of (I), except for a failed attack on certain familiar self-intimation principles. Moreover, by advocating a form of nonreductive functionalism himself, he tacitly accepts (II). While defending these points, the author discusses differences between Frege’s and Russell’s treatments of intensional contexts and the Kripke-Lewis controversy over theoretical terms.
|Keywords||Functionalism Intensionality Metaphysics Self-consciousness Theoretical Term Frege Kripke, S Lewis, D Russell Shoemaker, S Tooley, M|
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