What RoboDennett still doesn't know
Journal Of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):3-25 (2005)
| Abstract | The explicit aim of Daniel Dennett’s new paper ‘What RoboMary Knows’ is to show that Mary (the hypothetical colour-blind neuroscientist) will necessarily be able to come to know what it is like to see in colour, if she fully understands all the physical facts about colour vision. I believe we can establish that Dennett’s line of reasoning is flawed, but the flaw is not as simple as an equivocation on ‘knows’. Rather, it goes to the heart of functionalism and hinges on whether or not Dennett is correct to claim that there is ‘no fact of the matter’ about what subjective experience consists in. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Brain Cognitive Science Consciousness Human Robot Science Churchland, Paul M Dennett, Daniel Lewis, David | |||||||||
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