Contrastivism and lucky questions

Philosophia 37 (2):245-260 (2009)
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s anti-skeptical results.
Keywords Contrastivism  Discrimination  Epistemic luck  Relevant alternatives  Epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9170-4
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Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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