David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):244-255 (2011)
The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e. the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be examples of states that it wrongly ascribes using only the causal connections available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.
|Keywords||Personal identity Psychological continuity theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Naylor (2008). Personal Identity Un-Locke-Ed. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):407-416.
Igor Douven (1999). Marc Slors on Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.
Simon Beck (2013). Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-9.
Desheng Zong (2011). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623.
Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-199.
Trenton Merricks (1999). Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
James Tartaglia (2012). Horizons, PIOs, and Bad Faith. Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):345-361.
Gerard P. Montague, Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self.
Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195 - 198.
Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
Michael C. Rea & David Silver (2000). Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):185-194.
Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
Sydney Shoemaker (1992). Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):139-143.
Added to index2011-06-15
Total downloads88 ( #13,650 of 1,099,028 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #43,697 of 1,099,028 )
How can I increase my downloads?