Epistemic luck and the generality problem

Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366 (2008)
Abstract
Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
Keywords Reliabilism  Generality problem  Epistemic luck  Veritic luck  Externalism  Theory of knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.

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