Epistemology Modalized

Routledge (2007)
Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and induction -- Is safety necessary for knowledge? -- Luck revisited : safety requires a process reliability condition -- Is reliability compatible with knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses? -- Knowledge : reliably formed sensitive true belief -- The theory -- Problems and clarifications -- Closure and the value problem -- Closure -- The value problem.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Modality (Theory of knowledge  Externalism (Philosophy of mind
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Call number BD161.B39 2007
ISBN(s) 0415956110   9780415956116  
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Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).

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