Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states

Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207 (1999)
Abstract
The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions.
Keywords Cognitive  Mind  Neural  Psychology  Science
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Richard Brown (2006). What is a Brain State? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.

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